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BOOK REVIEW
The War-Making Powers of the President
Reviewed by William M. Beaney*
THOMAS, A.V.W. AND THOMAS, A.J. JR., THE WAR-MAKING POWERS OF THE
PRESIDENT, SMU Press, Dallas (1982); $15.00; ISBN 0-87074-185-3, xii, 177 pp.;
endnotes, index, forward by Charles 0. Gavin.
This carefully written, scholarly study brings the debate over the re-
spective war-making powers of the President and Congress to the posture
it had assumed by November 1982. Such has been the rapid flow of
events that recently, in November 1983, important new chapters have
been added to the tale ably recounted by Thomas and Thomas, co-au-
thors of nine books dealing with important international issues and devel-
opments. As Charles 0. Galvin concludes in the Foreward to this book:
[T]hey [the Thomases] have provided a historical, a critical, and an
analytical treatise which is a major contribution in the field. Although
they conclude that the power of the President to commit forces
abroad remains a dark continent of American jurisprudence, their
splendid work has illumined the subject to the benefit of all who
search the area.'
The heart of the difficulty arises from our separated and shared
power system which inevitably gives rise to many questions concerning
the respective powers of Congress and the President. One of the most
serious questions which arises is where the boundaries of their respective
roles in war-making lie. Article II of the Constitution spells out a poten-
tially powerful role in foreign affairs and national security in its terse list
of grants of presidential powers: "The executive power" encompasses du-
ties including commander-in-chief, making treaties, receiving ambassa-
dors and taking "care that the laws be faithfully executed." In the histori-
cal chapters (1-5) the authors reveal the accordian-like expansion and
continuation of war-making powers, dependent upon the philosophy of
the presidential office-holder and the particular issue involved. Franklin
D. Roosevelt, a strong President by any standard, abandoned use of force
* William M. Beaney is Acting Dean and Professor of Constitutional Law at the Uni-
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in Latin America, but did not hesitate to commit acts against Germany
long before the outbreak of World War II, belying United States neutral-
ity. His Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, told the Senate Committees on
Foreign Relations and the Armed Services that the Congress, in the exer-
cise of its power under the Constitution, lacked power to interfere with
the President's powers in the implementation of foreign policy and
treaties.'
The Constitution gives to Congress the power "to declare war." 3 The
same law allows Congress to "grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal," and
clause 14 authorizes "Rules for the Government and Regulation of the
land and naval forces."4 In addition, Congress can point to the power of
the purse and the "necessary and proper" clause as justification for a role
in war-making short of a declaration of war. 5
The basic dilemma facing the United States since the end of World
War II, when it assumed the role of leader of the free world, is that the
perceived enemy-the Soviet Union-has long-term goals which it seeks
to achieve by overturning unstable regimes through revolutionary means
and by confrontations with the United States in situations where it be-
lieves the United States will not respond. The Berlin airlift and the Cu-
ban Missile crisis and ensuing naval blockade represent Soviet miscalcu-
lations. Vietnam, on the other hand, was a Soviet triumph, because at
little cost (personnel and materiel) its surrogates inflicted a shattering
blow to the prestige and morale of the United States.
It is increasingly obvious that the "cold war" policies do not involve
declarations of war. Congress sat by during the Vietnam conflict, quite
content to follow presidential leadership (repeated appropriations; Ton-
kin Gulf Resolution) as the stakes and costs grew ever greater. As success
evaded South Vietnam and the United States, a "let's bring the boys
home" attitude developed in the American public. Nightly TV exposure
of the human and material costs of an undeclared war that refused to
yield victory turned public opinion, and eventually Congress, against
President Johnson's protestation that the United States effort would
eventually prevail. His successor, President Nixon, compounded his prob-
lem in Vietnam by covert actions which amounted to waging an un-
declared executive war.
Extending military assistance to a nation that seeks it violates no
principle of international law nor any provision of the United States Con-
stitution. This is true whether a treaty or simple executive agreement is
the chosen instrument for justifying the placement or employment of
armed forces.' More controversial are those agreements made in times of
2. Id. at 21.
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 11.
4. Id. cl. 14.
5. Id. c. 18.
6. THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 1, at 85.
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rebellion or turmoil when the United States intervenes to maintain peace
and stable government, such as in El Salvador. Of doubtful validity is
intervention, not at the request of the "assisted government" but of their
neighbors who claim to act under a treaty with the invaded nation, as in
Grenada this last fall. Of course, there are other acceptable principles of
international law available to justify such actions, as the supporters of the
Grenada "rescue" mission have made clear. The United States Constitu-
tion gives its citizens travelling abroad the right to protection and inter-
national law recognizes the legitimate exercise of sovereign power for that
purpose. Given the way the superpowers, and lesser powers, tend to tailor
the facts of any given situation to conform with international law norms,
there is nothing but the momentary displeasure of the world community
to deter or punish a major nation bent on protecting a self-proclaimed
national interest. Therefore, the heart of the controversy in the United
States arises from the endless struggle for supremacy between Congress
and the President with respect to war-making without a declaration.
Recognizing that the precedents and realities supported presidential
preeminence, Congress in 1973 adopted, over a presidential veto, the War
Powers Resolution 7 the most serious effort to this date by Congress to
limit presidential war-making powers. Claiming that the Act fulfilled "the
intention of the framers of the Constitution," the Act required consulta-
tion with Congress, reports to Congress and an opportunity for Congress
to ensure termination of hostilities and removal of United States forces
whenever the President proposes to introduce, or has introduced, United
States Armed Forces into hostile situations. Except for emergencies, the
import of the Act is that the President should consult with, and receive
congressional approval for, potential or actual war-making exercises. The
Act is filled with ambiguities and unanswered questions.
As the authors point out:
Section 2(c) of the resolution seems to restrict presidential power by
asserting that the constitutional powers of the President as Com-
mander-in-Chief to deploy forces abroad is limited to three types of
situations: (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authoriza-
tion, or (3) a national emergency created by 'attack upon the United
States, its territories, or possessions, or its armed forces.' "
None of these conditions was present in the Cuban missile crisis in which
President Kennedy acted to forestall the introduction of missiles with a
nuclear capacity in Cuba. Nor does this section take into account the
other foreign policy bases for presidential action: treaty power, executive
power, and, as Justice Sutherland proclaimed in U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright,
209 U.S. 304 (1936), the President's role as the nation's exclusive agent in
foreign affairs plus certain attributes derived from national sovereignty.
Understandably, President Nixon, who attempted to veto the 1973
7. 50 U.S.C §§ 1541-1548 (1973 & Supp. 1983).
8. THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 1, at 133.
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Joint Resolution, and subsequent Presidents have been unenthusiastic
with this effort of Congress to gain a more explicit share of the un-
declared war-making power. As early as 1975, President Ford showed lit-
tle concern for the Resolution's provisions in evacuating Americans and
Vietnamese from South Vietnam and in rescuing the merchant ship May-
aguez and her crew, though he did in the latter case notify Congress after
the action was completed.
The Carter Administration's softer international line presented fewer
occasions for controversy but the Reagan Administration's hawkish poli-
cies produced episodes in late 1983 that brought into sharp focus the at-
tempt by Congress to share in the war-making process. The suicide
bombing of the Marine quarters in Beirut, Lebanon in October led to an
agreement by the President to accept an eighteen-month limit on the
presence of the peacekeeping force, though the President skirted the di-
rect application of the War Powers Resolution. United States interven-
tion in Grenada later in October, assertedly to rescue American students
and to forestall the creation of a firmer Cuban presence, again raised
questions about the applicability of the War Powers Resolution. Presi-
dent Reagan, without formally complying with the Resolution, informed
Congress by a letter only after the military operation was well-advanced,
and subsequently announced through a spokesman that virtually all
forces would be withdrawn within 60 days. The popular success of the
American Grenada operation has blunted criticism based on international
law and the Constitution. After failures in Lebanon, Iran, and South Vi-
etnam, the frustrating program to prop up El Salvador, the lack of suc-
cess in supporting the overthrow of the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua,
and even world-wide rejection by our friends and others of the invasion as
a violation of international law has proved no deterrent. The Congres-
sional critics have been silenced-the foreign critics ignored.
What the authors have demonstrated is that while legal norms in the
body of international law have a role to play, it is hardly a substantial
impediment when the superpowers pursue their national interests. In do-
mestic law, the situation remains unclear. The attempt by Congress to fill
in the constitutional lacunae has not yet had a fair trial, but it has not yet
cowed Presidents into abandoning their great role in national security
and foreign policy, of which the use of military forces is an obvious part.
A final issue, with which the authors deal inconclusively: Is judicial
resolution possible? The lesson drawn from attempts to challenge the Vi-
etnam undeclared war is that courts, or at least most judges, are reluctant
to find intelligible constitutional standards to guide the judiciary. The na-
ture of the issue(s) involved suggests the wisdom of abstaining, which
leaves to the elected Congress and President the obligation to hammer
out reasonable compromises through the give and take of political life.
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